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BOOK REVIEWS
r. cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the International 
Criminal Law Regime, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005, xxviii 
+ 360 pp., UK£ 60 / US$ 110. ISBN 0-521-82474-5.
doi: 10.1017/S0165070X06214931
In Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the International Criminal Law 
Regime, Robert Cryer, Senior Lecturer in Law at the University of Nottingham, surveys 
the development of international criminal law and examines its legitimacy as a system. 
Despite historical and structural challenges, he considers that international criminal law 
constitutes a ‘regime’. The second part of his interesting study evaluates the regime’s 
commitment to ‘the rule of law’ by examining the problem of ‘selectivity’ in interna-
tional criminal law. 
Cryer uses ‘selectivity’ in two ways, which distinguishes his work from other 
accounts that examine the weaknesses of international criminal law. He refers, in one 
sense, to selectivity in terms of the definitional reach of international criminal law: 
which rules and principles constitute part of the international criminal system. In this 
context, Cryer devotes his final two chapters to detailed considerations of definitions 
of certain international crimes, and also of general principles of international criminal 
liability and defences to such crimes. But in a second sense, Cryer has in mind selective 
prosecution and enforcement of international crimes, which he terms selectivity rationae 
personae. Both manifestations of selectivity, Cryer argues, imperil the legitimacy of the 
international criminal law regime because they challenge the regime’s status as one 
adhering to the ‘rule of law’. When definitional selectivity arises, the rule of law is 
threatened because the body of international criminal law to be applied is variegated or 
uncertain. When selectivity rationae personae exists, that body of law is inconsistently 
applied. 
Fundamental to the first part of Cryer’s book is the notion that international criminal 
law has developed into a ‘regime’. Cryer borrows from international relations theory 
and follows Steven Krasner’s definition of a regime as one exhibiting a ‘set of implicit 
or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations’ (p. 125).1 It must be 
said that this importation from international relations theory seems somewhat lost in 
a work otherwise devoted to legal analysis. Cryer refers to the literature on regimes 
only sporadically, and uses the concept itself in different ways. He acknowledges the 
numerous criticisms that have been made of regime theory (pp. 125-126), noting that its 
focus on effectiveness excludes moral aspects and questions of legitimacy. Given that 
the second half of Cryer’s study critiques the international criminal legal system on the 
basis of its legitimacy in adhering to a rule of law ideal, his preferred definition seems a 
curious choice. 
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Cryer begins by traversing the history of prosecutions of international crime, at both 
the national and international level, from ancient Greece to the present day. Although 
he makes no claim to originality, Cryer’s coverage of the historical material is lucid 
and cogently assembled, if somewhat synoptic. One of the themes of the chapter is that 
some of the problems which beset earlier permutations of war crimes trials have had 
remarkable longevity and persist today (p. 21). Cryer reminds us that states have been, 
and remain, unwilling to engage in active prosecution of their own nationals (p. 35). 
Those accused of war crimes will often attempt to impugn the forum’s legitimacy as a 
substantive defensive strategy (p. 19). The majority of war crimes go unpunished, and 
the historical response to the commission of atrocity has been silence, or only partial 
redress (p. 72). 
Chapter 2 examines various mechanisms vital to the development of international 
criminal law enforcement, focusing on the role of national courts. Cryer devotes 
particular attention to the exercise of jurisdiction. While criminal jurisdiction remains 
predominantly exercised on a territorial or nationality basis, it is the place of – and defi-
nition of – universal jurisdiction in the international order which has generated particular 
controversy. Cryer is cautious to delineate what does not constitute an exercise of 
this contentious form of jurisdiction. It has been argued that treaties requiring states 
to prosecute offenders present on their territory create universal jurisdiction.2 Cryer 
correctly concludes that such treaties do not truly establish universal jurisdiction but 
instead extend or pool traditional bases of jurisdiction amongst those states party to 
them to achieve a common purpose; unless there is a collateral basis for jurisdiction 
in customary international law, nationals of non-party states would not be bound by 
the extension of jurisdiction (p. 81).3 Traditionally, universal jurisdiction existed only 
for the crime of piracy. Cryer concludes, however, that today universal jurisdiction 
‘probably covers war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide’ (p. 87). This view 
is persuasive but is not without controversy; the discussion would have been enhanced 
by a more thorough exploration of the application of universal jurisdiction to the pros-
ecution of these crimes.4
Universal jurisdiction raises the threat of selectivity rationae personae – selectivity 
of enforcement – because of its putatively political character (p. 83). But the supposed 
risks associated with universal jurisdiction seem somewhat overwrought, and it must be 
borne in mind that, for diplomatic and logistical reasons, this form of jurisdiction is only 
seldom deployed.5 Moreover, in states which afford discretion and independence to their 
prosecutorial bodies, the potential for politically motivated prescriptions of jurisdiction 
is considerably reduced. In this context, Cryer could have usefully referred to the set 
of preconditions carefully elaborated by Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal 
in Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v. Belgium), which, if adhered to by states, would restrain capricious assertions 
of universal jurisdiction.6 
At a definitional rather than a prescriptive level, Cryer suggests, universal jurisdiction 
raises more substantive issues of selectivity. It raises definitional problems because it 
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can expose an accused to an unpredictable forum: the accused can be prosecuted in any 
country. As Cryer notes, this should not be problematic if there is definitional conver-
gence across jurisdictions on the core crimes (p. 97); but the varying definitional ambit 
of international crimes, which Cryer explores in the second part of the book – not to 
mention the differences in criminal procedure and due process guarantees across various 
jurisdictions – suggests that such global convergence will prove elusive. 
Chapter 2 also contains a stimulating discussion of the domestic incorporation of 
international crimes. The harmonisation of international crimes will be fundamental to 
the establishment of a true regime of criminal international law. However, it remains 
the case that states which require domestic legislative implementation before inter-
national crimes can be prosecuted will often not incorporate those crimes in similar 
ways. Various domestic political or legal factors may colour a state’s domestic imple-
mentation of international crimes, leading to inconsistency across jurisdictions. Cryer 
cites the example of states’ implementation of the Geneva Conventions as one such 
example of inconsistent and inadequate implementation (pp. 119-120). Further scope for 
uncertainty exists when the elements of international crimes come to be interpreted and 
applied by national courts. In the Barbie case,7 the French Court of Cassation went 
beyond customary international law to hold that a crime against humanity must be 
committed in furtherance of a common plan instigated by a state practising a hege-
monic ideology – a requirement extraneous to the customary definition of crimes against 
humanity (p. 122). Similar definitional problems concerning crimes against humanity 
afflicted the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision in R v. Finta.8 Cryer concludes that the 
absence of authoritative definitions of international crimes has impeded the development 
of international criminal law as a system of determinate and unified content (p. 123). 
Cryer’s discussion of national developments in international criminal law, and his 
detailed analysis of whether there is a duty on third states to prosecute international 
crimes, would have been enhanced by a discussion of immunities, which he mentions 
only briefly in the context of jus cogens (pp. 113-114). The operation of national immu-
nities has been a significant barrier to national prosecution of international crimes, 
highlighting the friction between a horizontal legal order of sovereign equality and a 
nascent vertical regime of international criminal law enforcement.9 The extent to which 
the regime of international criminal law enforcement is able to penetrate national 
legal orders will often turn on whether immunity operates as a bar to prosecution. The 
question of when the prosecution of international crime should override immunity is one 
of extreme theoretical interest and practical importance, and it is striking that Cryer does 
not address this issue. 
Chapter 3 discusses the ways in which international criminal institutions interact in 
the international system and with national courts. The International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) enjoy concurrent jurisdiction, and primacy, over national courts and, pursuant 
to Article 25 of the UN Charter, and Articles 29 and 28 of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes, 
respectively, compel UN member state co-operation. This is a vertical, rather than bilat-
eral, obligation; and it is coercive rather than co-operative.10 Indeed, the ICTY Appeals 
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Chamber has held that the obligations flowing from Article 29 of the ICTY Statute (and, 
by analogy, the concomitant obligations of Art. 28 of the ICTR Statute) are obligations 
erga omnes (p. 133).11 Nevertheless, the legal power of the Tribunals has in practice 
been circumscribed by their lack of enforcement apparatus and reliance on state assis-
tance in arresting and transferring suspects (p. 137). 
The ICTY and ICTR are temporary international criminal law enforcement measures, 
and, according to Cryer, can be considered only as rudiments of a regime. With the 
entry into force of the Rome Statute of the ICC, a ‘fully fledged’ regime of international 
criminal law has arrived (p. 146). Only a few years after its commencement, to describe 
the ICC as a comprehensive regime that, in Cryer’s words, imposes ‘substantive rules 
which structure expectations’ (p. 143) seems overly sanguine. This initial optimism is 
surprising, as Cryer is certainly alert to the shortcomings of the ICC model. Theoreti-
cally, it is certainly arguable that the ICC constitutes a regime of substantive rules; in 
practice, the problems created by non-States Parties, the role of the Security Council and 
disincentives to co-operate may well be significant. 
The ICC certainly expands the international criminal legal system through its use 
of complementarity: it is intended to operate only when international norms cannot be 
enforced in national courts. Normatively, complementarity persuades national actors 
to embed international norms in their domestic legal orders. In this area, the domestic 
effects of the Rome Statute may calibrate expectations and guide behaviour. The opera-
tion of the complementarity mechanism in the Rome Statute could potentially lead to the 
greater harmonisation of international criminal law. Cryer examines this harmonisation 
by surveying judicial consideration of the Rome Statute in international jurisprudence, 
and the incorporation of the Rome Statute in domestic legal orders. He concludes that 
the Rome Statute ‘now appears to be forming the default definitions of international 
crimes when new documents are drafted’ (p. 184). It may also form the default instru-
ment for judicial interpretation of statutes or treaties which call for interpretation of 
international crimes.12 
In the first and second parts of his book, Cryer devotes particular attention to the 
role of the Prosecutor, who holds a central place in the ICC Statute (and indeed in inter-
national criminal law) both diplomatically and legally. The experience of the ad hoc 
Tribunals demonstrates the curious, somewhat schizophrenic, role of an international 
prosecutor, who must function as both lawyer and diplomat, often simultaneously.13 
The right balance between these two roles – between the twin goals of effectiveness in 
the international arena and the legitimate application of legal norms – will be crucial 
towards securing state co-operation and assistance, and vitally important in the deploy-
ment of the Prosecutor’s proprio motu powers, which allow investigation without a 
referral (subject to confirmation by a pre-trial chamber).14 The Prosecutor’s independent 
powers of investigation were strongly criticised by the United States in the debates 
at Rome, which feared that proprio motu powers would open the Prosecutor to polit-
ical influence and the potential for capricious prosecution.15 But as Cryer notes, the 
level of oversight is high and the Prosecutor’s discretion is ‘carefully circumscribed and 
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reviewable’ (p. 226).16 The development of guidelines for the application of the Prose-
cutor’s powers will provide a crucial contribution towards enhancing the international 
legitimacy of the ICC.17 Similarly, indicia to determine what constitutes an inability or 
unwillingness genuinely to investigate or prosecute will be vital to the structuring of 
expectations and the legitimate operation of the complementarity mechanism.18
Part 2 of Cryer’s study evaluates this system of international criminal law enforce-
ment from the perspective of definitional selectivity and selectivity rationae personae. 
Both forms of selectivity undermine the regime’s claim to function as a system adhering 
to the rule of law. The phrase, ‘rule of law’, is one in frequent use. Cryer has in mind 
Lon Fuller’s understanding of the concept: as a system of general norms that exhibit 
certain characteristics of stability, consistency and equality (p. 195).19 This is a rigorous 
standard of evaluation for a regime that is very much in its early stages of international 
institutionalisation and doctrinal elaboration. Cryer’s method of evaluation indicates that 
he is working within a ‘liberal’ conception of international criminal justice; he sees the 
international legal order as an outgrowth of its domestic counterpart. Similarly, he does 
not question international criminal law’s emphasis on the responsibility of individuals in 
situations of mass atrocity; he refers only in passing to state and collective responsibility 
for international crime.
Chapter 4 examines selectivity rationae personae by considering selective enforce-
ment throughout the development of the international criminal law regime. National 
practice indicates that states have been extraordinarily reluctant to subject their own 
nationals to the ambit of international criminal law when it is possible to immunise them 
from its reach. Prosecutions have generally been limited to the crimes of a past regime, 
or of foreigners. On the international plane, international tribunals have raised similar 
problems of selectivity. At Nuremberg, alleged violations by the Allies were overlooked; 
at Tokyo, it was not contemplated that the bombings of Hiroshima or Nagasaki would be 
prosecuted. Of course, selectivity of enforcement occurs in relation to domestic crime. 
Scarcity of resources dictates that a state cannot prosecute every alleged transgression 
of the criminal law; prosecutorial discretion must be exercised. Such discretion remains 
acceptable if it is exercised consistently and follows preconceived policy. The same 
should also be true on the international plane. But international criminal law seems 
coloured by politics because of the open texture of the international system, and because 
the effective enforcement of criminal norms by international tribunals relies vitally on 
the political will of states. While Cryer’s discussion contains much reference to the 
practice of tribunals and the varying definitions of crimes, one could have hoped for 
greater analysis of what constitutes an acceptable exercise of discretion in international 
criminal law. 
In turning to various examples of selectivity rationae personae, Cryer devotes partic-
ular attention to the ICTY Prosecutor’s response to allegations that NATO forces had 
committed war crimes in 1999. In response to calls to investigate NATO’s bombing 
campaign, in 1999 then ICTY Prosecutor Louise Arbour set up an internal committee to 
deliver a report outlining whether a formal investigation should be undertaken; in 2000, 
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after the internal report was completed, the new ICTY Prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte 
informed the Security Council that, based on the findings in the report, she would not 
further investigate NATO actions. Cryer questions whether the decision not to prosecute 
was due to the level of seriousness of the alleged crimes, and suggests that ‘the decision 
not even to investigate is out of kilter with past ICTY practice’ (p. 218). The report 
itself has been subjected to intense criticism, and led to speculations about the levels of 
NATO pressure placed on the ICTY.20 While these accusations have not been substanti-
ated, certain aspects of the report have been strongly criticised and Cryer is probably 
correct that the Office of the Prosecutor’s approach left it open to charges of selectivity 
(p. 220). 
The controversy over whether to investigate NATO’s bombing was not the first 
time issues of selectivity have arisen at the ICTY. In the Čelebići proceedings before 
the ICTY Appeals Chamber, one of the accused, Esad Landžo, argued that he, as a 
Bosnian Muslim, had been selectively prosecuted specifically to counter suggestions 
that the Tribunal demonstrated bias against Serbs, and to give an appearance of ‘even-
handedness’ to the Office of the Prosecutor’s policy.21 This argument was rejected by 
the Appeals Chamber, which found that the Prosecutor’s strategy did not discrimi-
nate towards Landžo; the heinousness of the crimes he was alleged to have committed 
brought his prosecution within pre-existing prosecutorial policy.22
Chapters 5 and 6 focus on definitional selectivity. Chapter 5 examines definitions of 
crimes; chapter 6 examines principles of liability and defences. Both chapters highlight 
the tensions between effectiveness and legitimacy. Cryer’s contention is that a state 
will perceive the system of international criminal law as ‘safe’ or ‘unsafe’, depending 
on whether or not that state’s nationals are subject to international criminal jurisdic-
tion. Where their nationals are at direct risk of investigation and prosecution, states will 
attempt to circumscribe tightly the rules of international criminal law. Where a state’s 
nationals are not at risk, the definitional ambit will be more open-ended. 
Historical practice seems to bear this out. The architects of the Charters of the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals were determined that nationals of the Allies not be 
subjected to the scrutiny of those laws, and could afford to be expansive in their defini-
tions of the crimes to be tried. The same is true of the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR: 
because of their limited temporal and geographical jurisdiction, powerful states did not 
attempt to circumscribe the law to be applied. 
Negotiation of the Rome Statute, by contrast, involved states in drafting crimes to 
which their nationals could potentially be subjected. The participating states therefore 
saw it as their role not to accelerate the development of international criminal law but to 
restate comprehensively existing international crimes. It must also be borne in mind that 
the Rome Statute – in contrast to the ad hoc Tribunals, established under authority of 
the Security Council – was the outcome of a long and complex negotiating process. It is 
natural that it appears more conservative in its definitional reach, because of its negoti-
ating history and the numerous concessions required to bring it to life. 
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There are idiosyncrasies in certain definitions of crimes in the Rome Statute that 
reflect the imperatives of political compromise, and Cryer explores these with clarity 
and insight. He notes the contextual requirement for the prosecution of genocide in 
the ICC elements of crimes, which narrows the definition contained in the Genocide 
Convention by requiring that the conduct ‘took place in the context of a manifest pattern 
of similar conduct directed against that group or was conduct that could itself effect 
such destruction’ (pp. 246-247).23 Cryer’s analysis contains a thorough discussion of 
the shifting contours of a definition of crimes against humanity. The ICTY and ICTR 
have had significant latitude in developing the elements of crimes against humanity 
through judicial elaboration. As a threshold requirement, the jurisprudence of the ICTY 
requires a ‘widespread or systematic attack’, even though this language is nowhere used 
in the statute.24 Negotiations for the Rome Statute turned on whether the ‘widespread’ 
and ‘systematic’ elements of the ‘attack’ constitute a cumulative or disjunctive test. 
The result was a compromise; the definition effectively requires both widespread and 
systematic elements. But as Cryer correctly notes, this is a retrogressive step in terms of 
customary international law; the ad hoc Tribunals have repeatedly stressed the disjunc-
tive nature of the test.25 The higher threshold requirement is consistent with Cryer’s 
categorisation of the ICC as an ‘unsafe’ tribunal – one in which the countries which 
drafted the elements of crimes can be exposed to prosecution (p. 255). It also raises 
significant doubts about the possibility of increasing convergence, as national courts 
reaching for international interpretation may be torn between substantially different defi-
nitions. This is regrettable, as the elements of crimes against humanity have traditionally 
led to considerable confusion at a national level.26 
Chapter 6 examines principles of liability and defences. These topics are probably 
too complicated to be treated wholly successfully in a single chapter. Cryer notes that 
controversy over certain principles of liability in the ad hoc Tribunals has focused 
on those modes of participation not expressly mentioned in the Statutes (p. 311). The 
Tribunals have had considerable discretion to formulate various principles relating to 
collective participation in international crimes. Unfortunately, Cryer’s study contains 
scant analysis of the questionable reach of the ‘joint criminal enterprise’ or ‘common 
purpose’ doctrine as a mode of international criminal liability, which seeks to found 
liability on the formulation and execution of a commonly held criminal plan.27
Cryer’s discussion of command responsibility, though brief, is nuanced in its atten-
tion to the differences between customary international law and the formula contained in 
the ICC Statute. He draws attention to the lack of clarity that has afflicted jurisprudence 
in this area. In deciding upon separate regimes – and separate standards of mens rea 
– for military and civilian command responsibility in the ICC Statute, State Parties have 
sought to define with care the circumstances of criminal liability for command respon-
sibility that may arise. This survey of defences and principles of liability leads Cryer 
to conclude that certain elements of the Rome Statute are more restrictive formulations 
than required under customary international law. 
Prosecuting International Crimes is an ambitious and stimulating contribution to 
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the burgeoning literature on international criminal law. One of its many strengths is 
the close attention to the varying definitional ambits of international crimes, which 
serve, overtly or obliquely, to destabilise the effectiveness and legitimacy of interna-
tional criminal law. The breadth of Cryer’s study is significant, and many areas demand 
further amplification; but his account is an important attempt to trace how international 
criminal law has developed as a system. Equally important is his attempt to analyse how 
the legitimacy of the system has been and continues to be challenged. 
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lands. The views expressed in this review are those of the author alone.
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j.-m. henckaerts; l. doswald-beck, eds., Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, boxed set of 3 hardback books, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 2005, 5066 pp., UK£ 300. ISBN-10:0521539250 | ISBN-
13:9780521539258.
doi: 10.1017/S0165070X06224938
In Spring 2005, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) launched the 
study Customary International Humanitarian Law. Edited by Jean-Marie Henckaerts 
and Louise Doswald-Beck, this monumental work containing three volumes and more 
than 5000 pages sets forth 161 rules of international custom governing armed conflict. 
Even the most neutral description of the project is bound to impress. The preparation 
of the study took almost ten years. It involved national research teams, international 
research teams and an ICRC research team, together examining practice and opinio 
juris in some fifty countries and forty armed conflicts. Add to that a Steering Committee 
and a group of academic and governmental experts invited to comment on drafts of the 
study, and the result is an Acknowledgements section which reads like the society pages 
of international humanitarian law (IHL). 
The primary goal of the study is to capture the current state of customary IHL. 
Special emphasis is put on the law governing non-international armed conflict, since the 
codification of this part is only rudimentary (see Introduction, pp. xxviii-xxix). While 
the ICRC considers the study ‘primarily a work of scholarship’ and therefore ‘respected 
the academic freedom both of the report’s authors and of the experts consulted’, it 
believes ‘that the study does indeed present an accurate assessment of the current state 
of customary international humanitarian law’ (Foreword, p. xi). The ICRC has in fact 
presented the study as a product of the institution rather than an academic work of two 
of its staff members, inter alia, organizing a series of conferences around the world to 
discuss the findings of the study.1 This embrace of its findings by the ICRC certainly 
enhances the weight of a study that is already of great importance in its own right.
Both the editors2 and the ICRC (p. xvii) have expressed the hope that their work 
will not be taken on face value, but will prompt indebt discussion on various aspects of 
customary IHL. In this, they will undoubtedly succeed. The study has already given rise 
to serious debate in various fora about the role and content of customary IHL, its rela-
tionship to treaty law and the methodology of its formation and ascertation. These fora 
include the conferences mentioned above, law journals3 and the internet.4 National and 
international courts are also taking notice of the study.5
Needless to say, a project of this magnitude always leaves room for improvement 
and generates criticism on different levels. Professionals who focus on the practice 
ascribed to their own states will undoubtedly find an omission or inaccuracy here and 
there. On a more general level, some minor imperfections may be noted in the choice of 
sources and the way they have been processed. For example, one may question whether 
recommendations of the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal 2000, a ‘people’s 
tribunal’ organized by NGOs, belong in a study purporting to set out the current state of 
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customary IHL (e.g., Vol. II, pp. 3536 and 3593). With all due respect for the value of 
that initiative, I would think not, since the whole purpose of this ‘tribunal’ is to venture 
into territory where states refuse to go. 
Other entries are potentially relevant but of limited value to the reader for the rather 
general way in which they have been noted. I certainly believe that ‘in 1979, in a 
meeting with the ICRC, the leader of an armed opposition group stated that he was 
in favour of executing POWs who attempted to escape’ and that ‘in 1984 and 1988, 
an armed opposition group told the ICRC that it generally refrained from executing 
prisoners in reprisal and only pronounced death sentences on the basis of at least three 
witness accounts’ (Vol. II, p. 2400). I will leave aside the more fundamental question 
whether such statements of armed opposition groups can be qualified as relevant practice 
at all, and concentrate solely on the form in which they are brought to us. What are these 
concise statements worth if we do not have more information about the armed opposi-
tion groups meant, and the context in which these statements were made? Do these 
entries refer to one and the same armed opposition group, or to different ones? Did these 
statements reflect actual practice, or did these groups violate their position expressed 
to the ICRC on a daily basis? Highly relevant, but we do not know. We will not easily 
find out either, for the footnotes to these entries, and various other ones in the study, 
only refer to ‘ICRC archive document’ without any date or specification. While this 
anonymity may be an understandable consequence of the ICRC’s policy of neutrality 
and confidentiality, it does limit the value of the information provided. Still, these minor 
shortcomings do not significantly diminish the value of the study as a whole.
The editors have wisely tried to avoid some of the most contentious topics of 
customary IHL, such as the question whether IHL grants any leeway to persistent 
objectors (p. xxxix). Wisely, because their study shows that there are many facets of 
customary IHL which merit discussion apart from the most apparent bones of conten-
tion. To name only one: are there ‘specially affected States’ in IHL? The editors seem 
to think there are (pp. xxxviii-xxxix). While they note that all states have a legal interest 
in requiring respect for IHL and therefore the practice of all states must be considered, 
they do take the stance that there are specially affected states in IHL. Thus, they state 
that countries which have been identified as being in the process of developing blinding 
laser weapons are specially affected concerning the question of the legality of such 
weapons. Likewise, they consider that ‘[i]n the area of humanitarian aid, States whose 
population is in need of such aid or States which frequently provide such aid are to be 
considered “specially affected”’ (p. xxxix). Even: ‘[w]ith respect to any rule of interna-
tional humanitarian law, countries that participated in an armed conflict are “specially 
affected” when their practice examined for a certain rule was relevant to that armed 
conflict’ (p. xxxix). 
The editors are not alone in their liberal embrace of the concept of specially affected 
states in IHL. In a review of these contentions, two other writers go so far as to call the 
United States a specially affected state in IHL in the broadest terms: ‘A rule would be 
hard, if not impossible, to regard as having taken on customary status were a State such 
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as the United States opposed to it.’6 They support this rather improbable statement with 
the United States being ‘the outstanding laggard in signing IHL treaties and … therefore 
most likely to be affected by the confirmation of conventional rules as customary law…, 
very active abroad militarily and … at the forefront of developing new weapons tech-
nology’.7
I seriously question all these interpretations of the concept of specially affected states. 
In fact, it may be asked whether there are specially affected states in IHL at all. It is easy 
to see how the concept of specially affected states is useful when discussing delimitation 
of the continental shelf: some states have a continental shelf to delimit while other states 
do not and, one may assume, never will. There is an aspect of permanency there which 
is lacking in IHL. Belligerent states, one may hope, are the peace makers of tomorrow. 
Occupied states may be the occupiers of tomorrow. Customary rules develop slowly 
and should be stable enough to withstand such changing of positions. Moreover, one 
would think that it is irreconcilable with the very character of IHL to grant specially 
affected status to the manufacturers of certain dubious weapons, just as it would have 
been problematic at least to grant South-Africa specially affected status with regard to 
the question of apartheid. Yet, I see it as a strength of the ICRC study, not a weakness, 
that it provokes such discussions.
All in all, Henckaerts, Doswald-Beck and their many, many contributors have 
produced a more than impressive study on customary IHL. In fact, so impressive that 
one may question the ICRC’s decision to publish this study with Cambridge Univer-
sity Press. Would it not better have suited the ICRC’s mandate and mission to make 
the results of this important study available freely online? The ICRC publishes several 
useful IHL databases online,8 and this would have been a great addition. Such general 
access would certainly have benefited the dissemination and development of customary 
IHL, and perhaps it can be offered in the future. Until that time, the paper version of 
Customary International Humanitarian Law deserves the full attention of everyone who 
is seriously interested in international humanitarian law.
Ward Ferdinandusse
Public Prosecutor
Dutch Department of Prosecutions
1.  See for reports of a few of those conferences <www.rodekruis.nl/picture_upload/Upload%
20document%20Cust%20Law%20Conf.pdf> (The Hague), <www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/13/
2balgamwalla.pdf?rd=1> (Washington, DC), <www.apcml.org/documents/conf_brief_220605.
pdf> (US Naval War College) (all last visited 1 June 2006). See also a summary of the study by 
Jean-Marie Henckaerts in 87 International Review of the Red Cross (2005) no. 857, pp. 175-212.
2.  See Henckaerts, loc. cit. n. 1, at p. 197.
3.  See D. Turns, ‘Weapons in the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law’, 
11 Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2006) p. 201; T. Meron, ‘Editorial Comment: Revival of 
Customary Humanitarian Law’, 99 AJIL (2005) p. 817; and M. MacLaren and F. Schwendimann, 
‘The New ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law as an Exercise in the Devel-
opment of International Law’, 6 German LJ (2005) p. 1217.
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4.  See, e.g., <kennethandersonlawofwar.blogspot.com/2005/11/my-initial-reactions-to-icrc-
customary.html>.
5.  See, e.g., R (Al-Jedda) v. Secretary of State for Defence [2005] EWHC 1809 (Admin) (12 
August 2005) and Prosecutor v. Stakić, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, IT-97-24-A (22 March 
2006).
6.  MacLaren and Schwendimann, loc. cit. n. 3, at pp. 1232-1233.
7.  Ibid., at p. 1232.
8.  See <www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList2/Info_resources:IHL_databases?
OpenDocument>.
s.c. neff, War and the Law of Nations: A General History, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2005, xii + 443 pp., UK£ 55 / US$ 95. ISBN 
0-521-66205-2.
doi: 10.1017/S0165070X06234934
Whereas the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the sharp upsurge of terrorism over the 
past decade definitely suggested a concerted response on the part of the legal disci-
pline and a comprehensive review of the laws of war and of such pertinent concepts as 
self-defence and reprisal, it all seemed as if, for a while at least, international lawyers 
were benumbed by the very enormity of political circumstance. With hindsight, the 
great majority by far of that avalanche of comments launched over past years on the 
numerous acutely topical issues of war all seemed to labour from distinct myopia. In 
spite of heated academic debate scholars, as if mesmerized by the sheer vehemence of 
political response to the cascade of tumultuous events exemplified by 9/11, somehow 
had lost sight of the broader perspective. 
It is only fairly recent that academics managed to once more disentangle themselves 
from the stranglehold of immediacy. The work here under consideration is a case in 
point – and must be hailed as such. Along with recent works such as The Morality of 
War (2005), a highly instructive overview of ‘classical and contemporary readings’ 
or, be this from a somewhat different angle, Richard Tuck’s critical edition of Grotius’ 
chef d’oeuvre (2005), Stephen Neff’s War and the Law of Nations is to be welcomed as 
an extremely useful instrument to literally help put current events back in perspective. 
Two previous monographs – Friends But No Allies; Economic Liberalism and the Law 
of Nations (1990) and notably The Rights and Duties of Neutrals: A General History 
(2000) – stand out to suggest the author’s eminency to deal with the subject-matter at 
hand. 
If the present reviewer has often been puzzled by the apparent disinterest or debonair 
dismissal of history at the hand of international lawyers Dr Neff is a welcome exception. 
Witness the opening lines of his chapter on the history of international law in the second 
edition of Malcolm D. Evans’s manual (2006), where he actually refers to this situation 
as an ‘intellectual scandal’ and a ‘remarkable state of affairs, probably without parallel 
in any other academic discipline’. With some qualification perhaps, the present reviewer 
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is inclined to agree wholeheartedly with this obvious cri du coeur. To most modern 
internationalists legal analysis, in principle, represents an eminently abstract process, far 
removed from either the idiosyncracies of post-modern historical science or the myriad 
of complexities, often of an all too incidental and seemingly ephemeral nature, that 
constitute the object of historical research. To all likeliness, the progressively technical 
nature of legal scholarship has somewhat alienated students and practitioners from the 
roots and, at heart, social nature of the discipline. 
To that extent at least Dr Neff’s monograph is a must for all involved. Numerous 
topical issues of the law and persistent non-licets are dealt with here in their true histor-
ical perspective and illustrated with a wealth of well-researched material. Thus, the 
bewildering meanderings of that protean principle of self-defence are traced back to 
their origins and followed from close quarters all along the parallel (if forever winding) 
avenues of scholarly speculation and state practice. The same holds good for the various 
measures mostly ill-defined in legal parlance as ‘short of war’. Many recent off-hand 
commentators on these issues which, so far, have hardly been thoroughly investigated, 
could have availed themselves enormously from Dr Neff’s pages or, upon reading his 
treatise, would have made up their minds to hold their tongue and clip their words. 
Dr Neff’s historical narrative runs perfectly straightforward throughout. In line with 
the author’s primary goal as pronounced in the prelims of the book, it focuses on ‘legal 
conceptions of war, rather than on the substantive or technical aspects of the law of 
war’. The structure of the book mirrors this approach in its almost classical simplicity. 
Having pointed out the growing consciousness, identifiable independently in various 
ancient societies, of a distinct relationship between war and justice, Dr Neff evaluates 
the, again, very deliberate and purposeful historical process by which war came gradu-
ally to be considered as, if anything, an instrument of law enforcement, from there to 
discuss the subsequent deployment of elaborate just war theories (up to 1600). 
In the second part of the book Dr Neff elaborates the various challenges posed to 
the above-mentioned views of war by (notably) Hobbesian thought and the Leviathan 
itself (1600-1815). This is followed by an analysis of the heyday of war as the perfectly 
legitimate instrument of state policy, featuring a routine and ritual all of its own, in 
the century following Vienna, when formal criteria had come to replace moral ideas 
of perfection and laissez-faire was the universal battle-cry. The story is then carried 
on towards the resurge of medieval just war concepts (if cloaked differently) after 
Versailles, highlighting the heroic but doomed uphill fight of interbellum lawyers to 
trim the claws of the dragon. The rich narrative is drawn to a close in the evaluation 
of the many new riddles that, along with the old ones, have faced the UN over the past 
60 years, ranging from civil wars and liberation movements to, recently, international 
terrorism. 
One of the merits, indeed charms, of Dr Neff’s approach throughout is precisely his 
indefatigable pinpointing of the Auseinandersetzung of doctrine and state practice (that 
‘wary partnership’) as the key to the interpretation of the historic quest that is the subject 
of his narrative, and his description of how the law incessantly moulded war, as much 
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indeed as war kept moulding the law in that endless interplay of ‘profound thought 
and brutal practice’. Nowhere perhaps is this thesis more convincingly advanced – and 
indeed more pertinent to topical debate – than in Dr Neff’s painstaking appraisal of how 
international lawyers over the past century were all too long deluded by their less than 
realistic perception of society into claiming their (inevitably Pyrrhic) triumph over war 
as a tool of state policy; how, in a way, by cornering Realpolitiker, they themselves 
suggested the latters’ subsequent invocation, and indeed abuse, of that of old sacrosanct 
principle of self-defence. 
In all this, Dr Neff’s style is clear-cut enough, at times even laconic. His reasoning 
is terse, his conclusions are sound, even if, as duly acknowledged by its author, within 
the compass of a work of a mere 400 pages, the treatment of complex issues such as the 
hallowed just-war theories of the so-called ‘classics’ must needs be somewhat sketchy 
– and, one may add, at the hand of the Anglo-Saxon scholar, whether in approach or 
accents, not necessarily wholly in line with the evaluation by continental academics in, 
say, Haggenmacher’s tradition. 
All this in no way detracts from the many merits of Dr Neff’s ‘pioneering expedition’ 
and his fascinating analysis of the phenomenon of war as such, of the fundamental legal 
conceptions felt of old to be clinging to it, and of the forever shifting ideas concerning 
its legal nature and status. In the present reviewer’s appraisal, there are just two critical 
remarks to be made to impair, if only all too slightly, Dr Neff’s highly instructive mono-
graph, and these refer to the opening and concluding chapters of the book. In the opening 
pages, Dr Neff presents an impressive panorama of the origins and sources of the laws 
of war, encompassing the Asian (notably Chinese), Arabic (notably Islamic) and Indian 
(Buddhist) traditions. All this has become something of a mantra among legal histo-
rians. However, this ‘universalist’ approach is not followed up in subsequent chapters, 
when non-Western sources are hardly taken into account anymore and focus is conve-
niently narrowed down to the eminently Western perspective. With hindsight, therefore, 
these early glimmerings of wisdom, however instructive in themselves, remain relative 
Fremdkörper which do not make themselves felt as the narrative advances and, with 
the possible exception of Islamic law, have no bearing whatsoever on Dr Neff’s major 
theses. To be sure, most if not all works of similar purport labour from the same defi-
ciency and Dr Neff, definitely, is not to be blamed more than any of his colleagues for 
this sadly unsatisfying state of affairs, which otherwise is due mostly to the persistent 
lack of reliable and comprehensive in-depth research into non-Western sources. Unfor-
tunately, ours are still early days for an overall review of the subject-matter from the 
truly intercultural perspective. 
The other critical note refers to the closing pages of the book. Here one is struck by 
precisely the opposite situation: by the sheer wealth of semi-digested material, the status 
of the narrative in the concluding paragraphs is reduced to a descriptive rather than 
analytical tale – and not surprisingly so, one should perhaps add. Dr Neff’s work offers 
the perfect backdrop, no less and no more, for our forever urgent addressing that equally 
tantalizing and elusive enigma, that metamorphic chimera which keeps harassing man 
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and which, at the end of the day, is perhaps, if nothing else, the reflection of his own 
ambiguous nature. 
Dr Arthur Eyffinger
The Hague
s. rosenne, The Perplexities of Modern International Law, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden 2004, xxvi + 471 pp., € 121 / US$ 163. ISBN 90-04-
13692-4.
doi: 10.1017/S0165070X06244930
This book grew out of the lectures delivered by Rosenne at the 2001 General Course 
on Public International Law of the Hague Academy.1 It is, therefore, not surprising 
that reading The Perplexities of International Law feels a bit like attending a series of 
lectures. Rosenne takes his readers through a selected number of topics, providing an 
overview of the most important legal questions, structuring legal material, discussing 
state practice and the development of international law and repeatedly cautioning 
against unrealistic expectations of the power of law in international affairs. Occasion-
ally Rosenne also adds personal notes, for example where he refers to his long career as 
legal advisor to the Israeli government or where he describes how he first read the text 
of the UN Charter as a soldier in Egypt, ready to be sent to Burma. The book can thus be 
described as an advanced course in some selected topics of international law, delivered 
by a writer who builds on decades of practical experience. 
The book discusses, successively, the unity of international law, where to find inter-
national law, the position of courts and tribunals, the use of force, humanitarian law, 
human rights law, international personality, maritime spaces, air-, outer- and cyber-
space, treaties, responsibilities and remedies and the UN system. The chapters are well 
researched and contain solid introductions to a variety of areas of international law. 
However, they also raise some more general questions. There are, after all, other well 
researched and interesting advanced introductions to international law, that more or less 
cover the topics discussed by Rosenne. So what is it that makes this book different from 
other introductions to public international law? What is it that this book wants to say 
about the perplexities of modern international law? What is the perspective that informs 
the structure of the book, the selection of the topics and the ways in which the topics are 
discussed? Throughout the book, at least two possible answers to these questions are 
suggested.
The first is that the deeper-lying problematique of the book is the fundamental 
transformation of international law that took place since the late 19th century. In the 
introduction, Rosenne argues that, with the World Wars, the regional, local and civil 
wars and the Holocaust, the 20th century has witnessed the ‘collapse of the regime 
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based on the Peace of Westphalia of 1648’ (p. 3). The central place of this transforma-
tion is reflected in the structure of the book. In the first substantive part of the book, 
Rosenne takes up three major developments in international law that can be regarded 
as responses to the atrocities of the Second World War: (1) the prohibition of the use of 
force, together with a system of collective security; (2) international humanitarian law 
and (3) international human rights law. Where traditionally these topics appear in the 
latter parts of textbooks,2 for Rosenne these developments symbolize such an important 
transformation that they are dealt with right after the introductory chapters. 
Interestingly, however, Rosenne also immediately downplays the importance of the 
changes that took place in the international legal order. At the end of the day, Rosenne 
holds, international law is still a law of co-ordination between sovereign states, lacking 
clear rules of identification (p. 15). Thus, while the introduction professes the collapse 
of the Westphalian system, the concluding chapter informs the reader that the core of 
‘Westphalia’ is still standing: ‘The core of international law today as it always has been 
since the Peace of Westphalia is the independent sovereign State, and the heart of that is 
sovereignty’ (p. 454). This state-centric approach is visible in the way in which Rosenne 
discusses several specific topics, e.g., in his denial of the power of international organi-
zations to create general international law or in his emphasis on human rights as a law 
‘between States and made by States’ (p. 202). In this context it is regrettable that the 
book does not engage in a serious debate with those who have drawn different conclu-
sions from the fundamental changes in the international legal order. Good examples 
can be found in the 1990’s Hague Academy Courses of Simma and Tomuschat.3 Both 
Simma and Tomuschat acknowledged the enduring relevance of state sovereignty. 
However, they also held that the transformation of international law had moved the 
international order beyond a law of co-ordination towards a more encompassing ‘consti-
tutional’ framework for the international society. In similar (or perhaps even more 
radical) reading of international law was offered by the International Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia in the Tadić case. The Tribunal spoke of ‘the impetuous develop-
ment and propagation … human rights doctrines’ that had
‘… brought about significant changes in international law, notably in the approach 
to problems besetting the world community. A State-sovereignty-oriented approach 
has been gradually supplanted by a human-being-oriented approach. Gradually the 
maxim of Roman law hominum causa omne jus constitutum est (all law is created 
for the benefit of human beings) has gained a firm foothold in the international com-
munity as well.’4
Of course, such readings of international law raise many questions. Such questions, 
however deserve to be taken up, especially if one believes, as Rosenne does, that ‘the 
century just ended has seen the greatest transformations of human society in all recorded 
history’ (p. 1). 
The importance of the transformations in international law is further downplayed by 
Rosenne’s emphasis on the role of politics, especially in relation to the use of force. In 
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line with realistic readings of the attempts to outlaw war, Rosenne argues that decisions 
on the use of force are generally within the realm of politics rather than law and often 
taken without or against legal advise. Given the world of conflict and crises to which the 
Charter provisions on international security are to be applied, Rosenne repeatedly warns 
against rigid, overtly literal readings of this body of law. What is more, he believes that 
the inability of the international community to effectively regulate the use of force casts 
‘a shadow over all the other achievements – and there are many – in the progress of 
international law since the Second World War’ (p. 112). 
The second possible perspective offered by Rosenne is in the title of the book: the 
perplexities of modern international law. In this context, it is important to underline that 
for Rosenne this phrase has a very particular meaning:
‘The perplexities follow from conviction that universal peace will become a reality 
when we have a workable, rational, balanced and accepted system of international 
law and competent, impartial and appropriate instruments to enforce it when neces-
sary, that is in times of crisis. The world has not yet reached that state. That is what it 
is trying to find’ (p. 2).
This quote is interesting because it conveys two messages at the same time. It links the 
development of international law to an ultimate ideal and pictures the world as searching 
for a realization of this ideal. The idealistic element is mirrored in the final part of the 
book, where Rosenne presents his lesson to the readers. Here, Rosenne quotes from De 
Visscher’s critique of the formalism inherent in the pure theory of law. Such formalism 
would not only obscure the bearing of power on international law, but ‘… most of all, 
it has made men lose sight of the final justification for all law, namely the human ends 
of power which alone can impose upon the State, by the universal assent which they 
command, a moderating conception of power’ (p. 456).5 
However, Rosenne adds an important note of caution: since international law has 
not (or, to quote correctly: not yet) reached the end state of universal peace and inter-
national lawyers should not pretend otherwise. In a world of ever-looming conflict and 
political contestation, Rosenne argues, lawyers should refrain from formalistic or overtly 
idealistic readings of international law. Instead, he advances a contextual approach that 
situates legal rules in their institutional, social and political context and pays due regard 
to the object and purpose of specific rules. 
The critique of formalism also figures prominently in Rosenne’s discussion on the 
‘sources’ of international law.6 Rosenne approaches the problem where to find law from 
the perspective of the practicing lawyer who is asked for advise from a government. In 
this way, the purpose for which the advise was sought and the conceivable responses to a 
legal position become guiding in the search for and interpretation of legal material. Such 
a functional approach rules out black letter interpretations in favor of policy-oriented, 
contextual readings of international law. A few times, Rosenne even seems to take pride 
in not offering a general theory of philosophy of international law. International lawyers 
do not need to engage in ‘philosophical speculation’ (p. 26), Rosenne argues, because 
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‘governments do not want legal advisors as their legal advisers’ (p. 2). The latter may 
be true (perhaps even a truism) but this does not say much about the importance of theo-
retical reflection in international law as such. After all, Rosenne’s functionalism too is 
based on a set of assumptions regarding the nature of the international legal order, the 
proper role of lawyers and the ways in which valid legal arguments can be produced. As 
was set out above, such underlying assumptions appear where he discusses the evolu-
tion of international law, its core presumptions, the ultimate aim of world society or the 
methodology that lawyers should adopt. In that sense, Rosenne’s book has more theory 
to offer than he seems willing to admit.
From the foregoing it can be inferred that international law’s perplexity operates at 
different levels. It is visible in the proliferation of its subjects, its fields of regulation 
as well as in the rise of different judicial organs. Rosenne’s book takes due account 
of these developments, for example where he discusses new and complicated topics 
of international law such as cyberspace or the regulation of cloning. At a deeper level, 
perplexities are visible in the tension between international law’s universal pretensions 
and the politically divided and legally still highly decentralized world in which those 
pretensions are to be realized. This tension runs through Rosenne’s book, for example 
where he discusses bilateralism in treaty law or warns against naïve readings of the UN 
Charter. A third source of perplexity is the nature and identity of the international legal 
order. Rosenne assures his readers that deep-down the modern legal order is still a law 
of co-ordination between sovereign states. However, he also examines the major trans-
formations that took place in international law during the 20th century; transformations 
that have induced other writers to adopt different perspectives on the nature of interna-
tional law. As the above mentioned Tadić case demonstrates, such alternative readings 
may have an impact on the practice of international law as well. Finally, perplexities 
can be witnessed in international law’s uneasy position between morality and power. 
In Rosenne’s book this tension is illustrated by his discussion of the ambition of inter-
national law and the role of international lawyers. The ultimate aim of international 
for Rosenne is nothing less than universal peace, based on an effective rule of law. 
However, Rosenne also stresses that in his view lawyers can only contribute to the real-
ization of this ideal if they leave formalism and abstract moralism behind, face the role 
power and adopt a functional, approach towards international law; if they operate as 
policy-oriented moderates of power. 
Wouter G. Werner
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